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Ontology and Explanation
Scott Mann
This paper critically assesses some recent attempts to develop and update the basic 
categories of Aristotle’s ontology, by Jonathan Lowe and Brian Ellis. It defends these 
attempts in face of criticisms by John Heil, while also addressing, and responding to, 
some possible weaknesses in Lowe and Ellis’s accounts. The paper defends Boyd’s idea 
of higher order kinds as homeostatic property clusters.
1. Lowe
Jonathan Lowe has contributed to contemporary debate in defending a four category 
ontology which he sees as originally developed by Aristotle in his early work the Cat-
egories. The key discussion here seems to be that of Categories 1–3 where Aristotle 
talks about different sorts of predication, essential and accidental. In the former case 
he is concerned with properties essential to a subject’s being the kind of subject it is. 
In the latter with properties which can change without the entity in question ceasing 
to exist. Some properties can be either essential or accidental depending upon the 
subject which is the bearer of such properties. But Aristotle also identifies properties 
which are never predicated of anything essentially. Shields refers in this connection to 
such “non-substance particulars” as “the individual whiteness manifested by Socrates 
at a given time” (Shields, 2007:155).
Lowe’s ontology involves two fundamental categories of universals; substantial 
universals or kinds and property universals; and two categories of particulars, objects 
and tropes. A universal is “a repeatable entity, which can be borne by many different 
particulars, at different times and places” (Lowe, 2006:10). This presumably corresponds 
to Aristotle’s idea of both essential and non-essential properties. Substantial universals 
correspond to Aristotelian essences —  to those clusters of properties, or forms, which 
define kinds of substance. Objects are specific instantiations of such kinds, correspond-
ing to Aristotelian substances, as complexes of matter and form; “property bearing 
particulars which are not themselves borne by anything else” (Lowe, 2006:10).
Tropes are properties conceived as particulars, instantiations of property universals; 
presumably corresponding to Aristotle’s “non-substance particulars”. Lowe emphasises 
that tropes cannot “float free” nor are objects reducible to bundles of tropes. Rather, 
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properties, whether thought of as universals or tropes, are “the ways objects are” (Lowe, 
2006:14). An object’s redness is its “way, or mode, of being coloured”. According to 
Lowe, this ontology is uniquely able to “account for the ontological status of natural 
laws by regarding them as involving ... substantial universals”. Things have particular 
powers and dispositions to behave in particular ways in particular sorts of situations 
by virtue of the kinds they instantiate. Reference to such kinds therefore explains the 
behaviour of the things in question in the relevant sorts of situations.
2. Heil
John Heil has criticised Lowe’s ontology (Heil, 2003). He sees himself as following 
Locke, in particular, in refuting the reality of universals of any kind, both property 
and substance universals, in favour of a two category ontology of individual objects 
and tropes or modes. Heil sees no need for the idea of a shared universal property 
that makes two objects instances of the same kind, because we can instead refer to 
their sharing “exactly similar modes”. At the same time, he sees the idea of perfect 
similarity as a limiting case of imperfect similarity. Heil claims that the supporters 
of universals see transcendent universals as existing “outside of space and time”. And 
immanent universals have the equally problematic capacity to be wholly present in 
different places at the same time. Modes, by contrast, are “uncompromisingly and 
straightforwardly denizens of the empirically accessible spacetime domain, restricted 
to existence in one place at a time” (Lowe, 2006a).
But it is far from clear what Heil means when he substitutes “perfectly similar 
modes” for universals. It would seem that no two modes can ever be perfectly similar, 
insofar as they have different spacetime locations and are either properties of different 
objects or different properties of the same objects. The only ways in which modes could 
be perfectly similar is in being modes, rather than any other ontological category of 
thing, or in involving the instantiation of a numerically identical universal. But Heil 
rejects both the idea of a hierarchy of properties, including properties of properties, 
and the idea of properties as universals.
For Lowe, as for Aristotle, universals exist either as instantiated in spatiotempo-
rally extended individuals or as real possibilities of such instantiation. Only certain 
combinations of properties are stable in particular circumstances. An individual can 
exist only as an instance of a possible kind or an aggregate of such instances. And 
existing things have real capacities, through their actions and interactions, to produce 
further things with particular properties. Living things produce more living things; 
human societies produce artefacts; dust clouds condense into stars.
Heil refers to Lowe identifying the power of a particular instance of aqua regia 
to dissolve gold as a consequence of facts about kinds. He quotes Lowe as saying 
that “objects derive their powers” from kinds. Heil argues that the kind concept is 
explanatorily redundant. In Heil’s own ontological scheme the power of a particular 
instance of aqua regia to dissolve gold actually derives from this instance of aqua 
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regia being aqua regia —  in the sense of, as Heil says, “answering to the aqua regia 
term or concept” (Heil, 2006:16). Heil argues that there is no explanatory advantage 
in saying that instances of aqua regia have their gold dissolving power because they 
are instances of the kind aqua regia.
A four categorist would respond by saying that instances of kinds are distinguished 
by their essential natures, or defining structural features, which explain their other 
features —  their behaviour, their development, their relations with other things. This 
particular thing A (this tank of aqua regia), has the power or disposition to do X (to 
dissolve this lump of gold), if appropriately triggered in a Y type situation (the gold 
is immersed in a fresh solution) because it is one of those Z kinds of thing (it is an 
instance of aqua regia) characterised by a particular essential distinguishing struc-
ture (it is a mixture of nitric and hydrochloric acid molecules) and reference to that 
structure explains the power in question (the nitric acid acting as oxidiser forms a 
few positive gold ions and the hydrochloric acid supplies negative chloride ions which 
react with the gold ions to produce a soluble gold salt Ag Cl4).
Heil tries to reject such a concept of explanation by rejecting the distinction between 
categorical and dispositional properties, with the latter thought of as grounded in, 
and explained by, the former. He argues that all properties are both dispositional and 
categorical. So the aqua regia is just something that has the intrinsic gold dissolving 
capacity. We explain the dissolution of the gold by noting that it came into contact 
with something with a gold dissolving capacity.
Such ideas might have appeal to empiricists. But a realist would argue that these 
are the things that need to be explained. Why do these instances (of aqua regia) share 
this power? What is the basis of this power? Heil’s shift from kind to concept reflects 
his idea that there are many possible ways of drawing the boundaries or dividing up 
the world into kinds. Our singling out some similarities for special recognition rather 
than others reflects our interests even though, as he says, “that which is singled out 
is objective and mind independent”.
3. Locke
In Book III of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke followed Aristotle in 
attributing explanatory primacy to essences or substantial universals, in accounting for 
qualitative distinctions, of kinds of objects in the world as perceived. But Locke was 
influenced by positivistic, mechanistic and atomistic ideas of his day in understand-
ing such explanation as typically involving reference to underlying micro-structures 
of imperceptible component elements. Locke advanced three principal arguments 
against the existence of essences in this sense. In the first instance, as intrinsically 
imperceptible, such essences are beyond all possibility of verification and hence with-
out justification. In the second instance there are actually “no chasms or gaps ... in the 
visible corporeal World” which justify any objective classification of different —  sta-
ble, qualitatively distinct —  kinds of things, whose stability and distinctness stand 
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in need of explanation by reference to discrete essences (Kornblith, 1993:20).1 In 
the third instance, even if there were such gaps or chasms in the world as perceived, 
there would be no reason to prioritise a classification based upon such chasms. For 
there will always be other ways of dividing up the natural world, depending upon our 
particular human purposes and priorities.
But, as Kornblith argues, none of these arguments can be supported. In the first 
instance, the world as perceived does, in many areas, exhibit precisely the kinds of 
chasms Locke denies. This is evidenced by e.g. common biological classificatory schemes 
which have evolved quite independently across a range of different cultures. It is evi-
denced by the fact that the human race has survived and developed on the basis of 
what have turned out to be generally reliable inductive inferential processes grounded 
in just such perceived differences and regularities. Certain perceptually distinguish-
able kinds have turned out to be edible (or poisonous), to be good stones for making 
tools or building houses, to be relatively safe creatures to hang out with or dangerous 
creatures to avoid etc. In the second instance, just because essences, constructed in 
imagination to explain such differences, are not immediately perceptible, this in no 
wise undermines the possibility of verification by reference to novel predictions of 
observable consequences of the existence of such essences. Not only have a range of 
such essences been verified in this way, but so have previously imperceptible entities 
and processes become increasingly more directly observable through the development 
of appropriate new technologies shaped by the theories in question. In some cases such 
verification has confirmed the original perception based classification. In others, it has 
served as a principled basis for reclassification. And this points to the obvious answer 
to the third objection, while other sorts of — subjective — classificatory schemes are 
obviously possible, they lack the — objective — explanatory power of reference to real 
essences. We can “choose” to continue to classify whales as fishes, for some purpose or 
other. Their superficially similar shapes and behaviours are a common feature of adap-
tion to living in a liquid medium. But reference to their underlying structural differences 
hugely increases our understanding of their behavioural similarities and differences.2
4. Ellis
When contemporary natural kinds theorist Brian Ellis refers to the essential natures of 
things it is in this Lockean sense that he understands essential natures; as underlying 
structures or organisations of component parts which are jointly responsible for the 
clustering of the observable properties by which we were initially inclined to classify 
1 As Kornblith says, “If there were real kinds in nature there would have to be chasms or gaps separating 
one kind from another for otherwise things differ from one another not by kind but only by degree. 
But when we examine nature we find that there are no such gaps” (Kornblith, 1993:21).
2 Just as our ideas of the boundaries and reference of kind universals can change so can our ideas of the 
boundaries of some sub system within a structure of some kind. But this is a process of correction and 
development, not some arbitrary change of focus.
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the relevant objects into kinds; or which have led to a principled, causally based, 
revision of such classification. Ellis argues that the essential properties of a thing 
are found amongst its intrinsic properties, properties which it has independently of 
causal relations with other things. Some kinds of thing, like fundamental particles, 
have no intrinsic properties accidentally. Other kinds can have intrinsic properties 
accidentally, as with a crystal which has been electrically charged. Ellis argues that 
only certain combinations of properties qualify as genuine natural kinds. Chemical 
elements, compounds and such aggregates of elements and compounds as pieces of 
metallic copper and crystals of copper sulphate qualify as natural kinds by virtue of 
“being categorically distinct from each other ... with no gradual transition from one 
chemical kind to any other” (Ellis, 2002:26–28). And such distinguishing properties 
turn out to be fully explicable by reference to underlying essential and intrinsic proper-
ties of atomic and molecular structure. More complex biological and social structures 
“fail the categorical distinctness test” and are not real natural kinds.
Ellis’s scepticism about biological kinds centres upon modern evolutionary and 
genetic theory which recognises that “the distinctions between the extant species 
are not always clear, and there are some well known cases of continuous variation 
between what would generally be agreed to be different species...” (Ellis, 2002:29). He 
is even more dismissive of any idea of social essence. He says “as we move to yet more 
complex systems, from biological organisms to ecological or social systems, natural 
kinds analyses become much less interesting. There are no natural kinds that satisfy 
the strict criteria applicable to chemical kinds ... Therefore, however successful the 
sciences of ecology, economics, sociology and the like may be in achieving their ends, 
we have no good reason to be realistic about the theoretical entities they employ...” 
(Ellis, 2002:32). Ellis has resurrected Locke’s argument about a lack of “gaps” separating 
one kind from another in the biological and social worlds. And while Locke rejected 
all essences, in part, by appeal to an empiricist methodology, Ellis has rejected higher 
order essences by appeal to a priori ontology.
5. Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds
Higher order kinds are characterised by a complexity, a variability, and an intrinsic 
dependence upon other things at odds with too simple an essentialist account and with 
Ellis’s identification of essential properties with intrinsic properties only.3 As Aristotle 
3 This possibly applies to lower order physical kinds as well. There are arguments to the effect that what 
are, in Ellis’s view, essential properties of physical systems, are actually relational properties. Dennis 
Lehmkuhl, e.g., argues that “the properties of mass, stress, energy, and momentum should not be seen 
as intrinsic properties of matter, but as relational properties that material systems have only in virtue of 
their relation to spacetime structure” (Lehmkuhl, 2011). Maudlin argues that all coherent contemporary 
interpretations of quantum theory (David Bohm’s ontological interpretation, and Ghirardi, Rimini 
and Weber’s and Perle’s spontaneous collapse theories) agree that “the physical state of the world is not 
separable” (Maudlin, 2007:62); meaning that it is not the case that objects situated in different parts of 
space “can lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent of one another”, (Maudlin, 2007:53). 
Quantum properties are essential, but they are not “intrinsic” in Ellis’s sense.
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recognised, complex kinds — of living things (e.g. frogs) and social systems (e.g. feu-
dal societies) — exist only through ongoing homeostatic (causal) interactions of their 
component parts, with each other and with aspects of their ambient environment. 
And while such components can sometimes exist in different sorts of environments 
or complex structures, they take on — or lose — properties and powers by virtue of 
their positions within particular structures.
As Richard Boyd argues, it is appropriate at this level to identify kinds with clusters 
of interdependent underlying and surface properties, rather than with fixed sets of 
underlying properties necessary and sufficient for (particular) kind membership and 
for causal explanation of surface properties. Kind membership depends on substantial 
overlap of individual properties with those of the cluster, allowing for significant varia-
tion within a kind and for change in such defining properties over time. But the causal 
structure of the world places significant restrictions upon what sorts of structures are 
stable in particular environmental circumstances, and what sort of structures can be 
produced by existing sorts of structures (Boyd, 1999).
It’s true, as Ellis observes, that there are intermediate historical steps between 
biological species, as well as variation within populations. But only certain structures 
of interdependent genotypes and phenotypes can survive and combine to produce 
viable offspring in particular situations. And if Eldredge and Gould are correct, then 
most species exhibit little net evolutionary change for most of their geological history.
Such complex homeostatic systems exist only in and through ongoing interac-
tion with complex environments, so that their essential properties include relational 
properties. As Aristotle recognised, plants and animals exist only so long as they 
take in nutrients and excrete waste products; animals only so long as their ongoing 
perception-guided movement around that world allows them to find food and mates, 
escape predators etc. Human societies exist only though ongoing interaction with the 
natural world, through agriculture, construction, manufacture etc. Both populations 
of living things and human societies have been destroyed through damaging the 
external conditions of their own existence.
Aristotle identifies people as “by nature socio-political animals” meaning that they 
can only function or flourish as human beings within a socio-political structure of some 
kind — considered as an organised totality of political organisations, economic relations 
and civil society associations. As Shields says, “Aristotle sees an intimate, symbiotic con-
nection between human nature and socio-political association” (Shields, 2007:53). He 
identifies the polis, or state broadly conceived, as a structure existing prior to the indi-
vidual, shaping all aspects of individual development, and itself having developed “in an 
organic sort of way from simpler forms of communal organisation” (Shields, 2007:385).
Such interactions are therefore essential to plants, animals, humans and human 
societies being the kinds of things they are. More complex structures, with new and 
emergent kinds of powers, (conferring new powers upon their component entities) 
come into being and continue to exist only within pre-existing complex structures, 
which shape, cushion, sustain and protect them, even as they themselves contribute to 
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the maintenance (or degradation) of the structures in question. In basing his account 
upon what he takes to be essential features of chemical kinds Ellis simply fails to 
consider the essential features of higher order kinds.
6. Social Systems
Some of the essential attributes of life are unique to living things — cells containing DNA, 
growth and development, reproduction and evolved traits. Others are shared with other 
sorts of complex systems — self-regulation of internal conditions, responsiveness to 
their environments, and energy transfer between such systems and their environments.
Different sorts of living things exercise these functions in different ways, through 
different sorts of bodily structures and metabolic processes. These different sorts of 
structures and processes themselves provide the basis for distinguishing different 
biological domains, as higher order (kinds of) kinds. Amongst the eukaryotes — with 
cell nuclei and organelles — the plant and animal kingdoms are distinguished by the 
photosynthetic food production of the former, as against the ingestion of food by the 
latter, amongst other things.
As Aristotle recognised, just as biological systems are distinguished by specifically 
biological “emergent” powers or functions over and above the physical and chemical 
powers of their component compounds, so are human social systems similarly dis-
tinguished by specifically social emergent powers and functions, over and above the 
biological powers of their component living systems — plants, animals, people. This 
includes economic functions of organised production and distribution of goods and 
services (mediated by developing social and material technologies), political functions 
of social integration and dispute resolution (the making and enforcing of laws and bor-
der protection), and ideological functions of distribution and updating of (organised 
and developing systems of) beliefs and values. Just as essential biological functions are 
exercised by different sorts of biological structures in different sorts of organisms, so are 
such social functions exercised by different sorts of social structures in different sorts 
of human societies. In the modern world, state structures, private business organisa-
tions and civil society groups play more or less significant roles in exercising these 
three essential functions. Principled typologies of social forms highlight the differing 
roles of particular social structures in relation to the three essential social functions.
Ellis argues that the absence of biological and social kinds precludes realistic inter-
pretation of any biological or social theory seeking to explain appearances by reference 
to underlying essential structure. In fact, real explanatory and predictive power on 
the part of a theory is typically evidence of the operation of real causal processes and 
mechanisms.4 Variations of the homeostatic property cluster model for complex kinds, 
4 A theory’s capacity to generate new knowledge through confirmation of novel predictions, along with 
internal coherence and compatibility with established knowledge, provides the rational basis for realistic 
interpretation. As instrumentalists point out, some explanatory models with histories of successful 
knowledge generation — through confirmation of novel predictions — have turned out to be wrong. 
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including the interplay of genotypic and phenotypic elements, receive substantial sup-
port from the explanatory and predictive progress of biological science. And other 
such HPC models receive rather more support from the progress of social scientific 
research than is typically acknowledged.5
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But the fact that we can say this, supports the realist position. We have ultimately determined which 
models are correct. And most models with a successful record of knowledge generation have turned 
out to be at least partially or approximately correct.
5 I have in mind here, particularly, historical materialist social science, which highlights the causal pri-
macy of the institutions fulfilling economic functions in shaping the operation of institutions involved 
in political and ideological functions. In the modern world, the economic function — allocation of 
resources and control of production and distribution —  can be carried out by state power, by capitalist 
corporations. by social powers of civil society or by some combination of these.
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